SB Nation Dallas: All Posts by Ian Boyd

How the hell do you stop Baylor? Part I: What are they doing?

2013-05-22T14:32:12Z

After a third consecutive bowl appearance in 2012, it has become very apparent in Waco and beyond that the savior of Baylor football was not Robert Griffin III, but head coach Art Briles.

Briles had come to Waco via Houston in 2008. From 2002-07, he had transformed Houston from a Conference USA creampuff into a multi-season league champion with an explosive spread offense that had produced standouts quarterbacks like Kevin Kolb and Case Keenum. From 1999-2001, Briles had learned the college game under spread offense patriarch Mike Leach as Leach's running backs coach while adding his own contributions to the Texas Tech run game. This drastically improved the Tech attack.

Briles' own history as a football coach goes back to the 80's when he got started in Texas High School football, the hotbed of modern offensive creativity. Briles began as a Wishbone/Veer offense guru before embracing the possibilities of the spread passing game in the 90's and transforming Stephenville HS into a Texas 4A state power.

These roots are essential to understanding how Briles has come to develop the concepts of his particular brand of the spread offense.

When Briles left Houston to take the head coaching job at Baylor, he brought one extremely important person with him, Copperas Cove "athlete" Robert Griffin III. Griffin took over the quarterback spot as a freshman, and Baylor sent a small snowball hurdling down the mountain of possibility that exists for any FBS Texas school. This snowball eventually became an avalanche of offensive football.

After struggling through Griffin's freshman year and sophomore campaign, which was marred by a knee injury that put him on the bench, Baylor exploded into prominence in 2010 with a 7-6 record that included a win at struggling Texas. Then 2011 happened, and opposing coaches descended into Big 12 Hell, a world of burning sulfur, prodding demons, weekly shootouts, and a Baylor football program that could no longer be penciled in as a win, even for Bob Stoops.

After eventually disposing of rival TCU in the season opener, RG3 also took down Big 12 giants Texas and Oklahoma in Heisman moments that catapulted Briles' Baylor program into the national spotlight.

If Big 12 defensive coordinators were expecting their visitation in hell to be brief, they were in for a horrendous shock.

In 2011, Griffin had tormented Big 12 defenses with a season in which he threw for 4,293 passing yards at 10.7 yards per attempt. He flung 37 touchdown passes to only six interceptions while adding another 699 yards and 10 touchdowns on the ground.

In 2012, Florence threw for 4,309 yards at 9.3 yard per pass, with 33 touchdown passes to 13 interceptions, and 568 rushing yards with 10 more touchdown runs.

Griffin was unmistakably a legendary football player, and the seemingly minor differences in production between his campaign and Florence's (RG3 also faced a season with tougher Big 12 defenses) amounted to the difference in beating OU, UT, or TCU. However, it's now clear that Baylor has an offensive system that has to be taken seriously if opposing coaches want to transform their stays in hell into a stop in purgatory before ultimate ascendance into the heavenly bliss of yesteryear.

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So how did Briles build this system? What exactly is he doing that's so damned hard to stop?

Baylor's attack is a system that relies on simple principles and a holistic approach to attacking defenses that makes sense when viewed from an outsider's perspective, yet is strangely unique to football. To fully grasp what makes Baylor different, and seemingly unstoppable, you must examine three aspects of that system.

No. 1: The formations

Like most pure spread teams, Art Briles' typical offensive sets usually include four receivers and very rarely include fewer than three. However, Briles' understanding of "spread" is one of the purest you'll find in football.

Here's an example of the Air Raid-influenced Oklahoma offense in a four-wide receiver formation:

There are horizontal stretches for the defense from outside receiver to outside receiver, however nothing at all like what Baylor does on a routine basis:

Notice that the slot receivers are aligned way outside the hash marks. The wide receivers in Baylor's offense have extraordinarily wide splits in comparison with other teams. This serves a few purposes for the offense:

1. It makes effective disguise very difficult

Teams that want to bring outside defensive backs on blitzes or disguise which players will be covering the slot receivers have tremendous difficulty doing so when the receivers are so far away from the offensive line.

Oklahoma [used] a five-man box with their OLBs out wide to match the Baylor splits and their safeties deep to prevent scores. Baylor ran for 252 yards.

If you want the Baylor QB to wonder whether you are blitzing off the edge or covering the slot receiver you'll have to really book it right before or after the snap in order to reach your assignment, or the QB will have a pretty open pitch-and-catch for easy yardage.

2. It stresses the defensive perimeter

Thanks to Baylor's extensive screen-and-outside-throw package, you need players to be able to get out to those receivers in order to defend the screens and passes that will otherwise snatch up five to 10 yards per snap with relative ease.

3. It isolates some part of the defense

Defenses have to make choices with their alignments against Baylor. Are you going to maintain a normal six-man box to stop the Baylor run game and give up screen passes to the outside, or will you widen out your linebackers to stop the screens and hope they can get back inside to stop Baylor's run game?

In the image above you can see that Oklahoma has a five-man box with their outside linebackers out wide to match the Baylor splits and their safeties deep to prevent scores. Baylor ran for 252 yards in that game.

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No. 2: Holistic concepts

Many teams will spread the field with multiple receiver sets and attack the perimeter with the quick passing game, but not every team is actually able to spread out wide and still attack other parts of the field. Many of Texas' offenses under Greg Davis in the 00's drove Longhorn fans crazy with attacks that lacked a power run game or vertical passing threat.

Two-deep, pattern-reading defenses such as the one Oklahoma is deploying above against Baylor were created to stifle spread offenses by forcing them to drive the length of the field by being nearly perfect on short passes.

However, Baylor has their eyes on the entire field nearly all the time.

Perimeter concepts

Another feature of Baylor's extra wide receiver splits appears in their screen game.

At the last moment you see TCU cheat their linebackers' alignment after Baylor's QB Nick Florence has already received the play call. The right backer sneaks out to stop the hitch screen while the left backer cheats in to stop a run play.

As it turns out, it's a packaged concept that features a screen against the right backer with a run against the left backer. It's up to Florence to read the right backer and determine if the screen or inside zone run is the better playcall.

Lots of teams use this packaged concept, but the difference is in the split of the Baylor receivers. The slot receiver catches the screen four yards past the line of scrimmage, whereas many teams throw that pass behind the line. Thanks to tough running and good blocking by the outside receiver he finishes the play 13 yards downfield.

This kind of tactic requires a quarterback who makes quick reads and possesses the arm strength and accuracy to hit receivers split out wide. Every instant saved while the ball is delivered means less time for the defenders to respond and arrive to make the tackle. When the quarterback can make that throw accurately, the Bears are able to stay ahead of the chains with the yardage gained even before the receiver makes a move or breaks a tackle, which happens routinely.

Baylor has many spread passing concepts that they utilize, mostly based off of quick reads for the QB that can attack different parts of the field. But their ability to repeatedly hit the perimeter on screens for consistent yardage is primary to their overall success.

Downhill running game

Baylor has a very diverse running game that is built to take advantage of its personnel and spacing and also includes the Quarterback as a threat.

It includes but is not limited to:

Inside zone paired with bubble screens

Notice here that the wide spacing and threat of bubble screens to either side of the field transforms the normally downhill Inside Zone play into one in which explosive runner Lache Seastrunk is almost immediately in the open field by drawing the linebackers and safeties out to the flats.

Baylor has also used the play with bigger running backs like Terrance Ganaway or Glasco Martin, who find that running downhill through the arm tackles of linebackers darting back into place after checking the screen is an enjoyable exercise.

Zone Read

Instead of reading linebackers to throw the bubble screen, the QB will read the DE (or here an OLB) and either hand off or keep the ball based on the read. In this example, Baylor is aiming for the cutback lane with both the QB and the RB as an ode to Briles' Veer-option football past. As a result, the linemen are essentially blocking down at angles. Defenders who are looking to avoid being reached on zone blocks have to worry about the possibility of this "Zone slice" play punishing them for pursuing too hard.

Power Read

Baylor will utilize Power-O blocking by the offensive line, with a guard pulling into the hole. If the DE crashes inside, then the QB will hand the ball off to a sweeping WR or the running back, who handles the run much like an outside zone run. They also run Power Read with the back looking for the inside gap and the QB looking outside. As with all Baylor plays, there are multiple stress points and a quick read by the QB to determine which to exploit.

The run game is the lifeblood of the Baylor offense. It has enough diversity in keys, varying angles, and threats to present defenses with schematic problems aplenty before the opponent can even address the screen game, or the final component of Briles' death trap.

Play-action and vertical passing

In many of the clips you'll see opposing safeties lining up deep off the ball, as many as 15 yards, before the snap. This final element to the Baylor offense is the reason why.

Giving up 13 yards on a hitch screen pass is scary enough, but the way in which Griffin and Florence would routinely throw deep bombs over the heads of safeties for one-play scores absolutely terrifies defensive coordinators.

While coaches would want to bring the safeties either outside the hashes to help against the screen game, or closer to the line of scrimmage to stop the inside runs, the Bears' vertical passing game demands that they stay back.

Most essential to Baylor's success is the play-action game:

In the first clip, they catch Texas corner Quandre Diggs with a double move by Terrence Williams. The safety help isn't there because the safety is peeking into the backfield to stop the run.

In the second clip, Baylor targets Kansas State's Dante Barnett, the replacement safety for Ty Zimmerman, with Tevin Reese and a double move inside. Teams that have poor play on the back end will find their weakest links isolated and attacked vertically by Baylor. It's nearly impossible to hide major chinks in the armor at defensive back, and the stakes are six points.

While so much of the rest of the Baylor playbook urges defensive backs to fly downfield to make tackles on runners and receivers, the vertical passing game will quickly destroy defenders who play with flat feet or peek too long into the backfield.

No. 3: Tactics

Baylor is a no-huddle team, naturally. For defenders and opposing coaches, this means that in processing the myriad of places on the field where you are on the verge of being assaulted, you have next to no time. Most, if not all, of Briles' concepts begin with one quick read by the QB; this means that the offense thrives on simplicity. Baylor is basically an option offense in all that it does. The nature of spread passing games has become quick-triggered and based on one or two reads, just like the Veer offense that Briles operated in the 80's.

The danger for Baylor is if the defense becomes difficult to read and the QB is made to hesitate or has to make a decision with inaccurate information. However, utilizing any serious degree of disguise or different personnel groupings is made extremely difficult by the wide spacing of the Baylor personnel and the quick tempo. If you call in a blitz or exotic look and are unsuccessful, the Bears can hurry to the line of scrimmage and punish you for the mistake over and over again while you desperately try to switch to a safer call.

The better the grip Baylor has on the defensive approach, the quicker the Bears can snap the ball and make plays. They keep coming all day long, and Briles doesn't seem to remotely care about margin of victory or defeat. They've been held under 30 total points only four times in the last two seasons and never under 20. In that same stretch, they've scored 50 points or more nine times.

Essential to Baylor's ability to attack so many different parts of the field is the fact that Briles recruits so well to this system. He finds big, mauling kids to fill the offensive line and uses some of his best, most powerful athletes inside at guard or center so that defenses are forced to devote numbers in the middle to stop the run game.

At running back, Baylor balances power backs like Glasco Martin or Terrance Ganaway with explosive speedsters like Lache Seastrunk. The wide receivers have to block to play, but Briles prizes speed above all. His players are usually either accelerating from a stand still after catching a screen pass or trying to blow past safeties on play-action routes.

Quarterback is obviously the key to the offense. The ability to make quick decisions is a crucial element to a Briles QB, although this is also manufactured by playing in the system for years. The more essential physical gifts are a strong arm, accuracy, and enough mobility to force the defense to account for the QB in the run game.

The team features all of these elements in their 2013 personnel and likely a few more wrinkles that Briles has worked up in the offseason. So how can it be stopped? We'll get to that in Part 2.

Honey Badger vs. the critics: How will Tyrann Mathieu fit in the NFL?

2013-05-08T15:29:46Z

We live in a very critical age. It's popular to choose distrust and cynicism over faith or optimism when evaluating the world, and not least of all in the NFL draft. The thousands of mock drafts and evaluations that can be found online are a place where any excuse for criticism and sarcasm is embraced. If a compelling reason emerges to dislike a player's pro prospects you can expect the cynicism to flow freely.

Sometimes the resulting criticism goes overboard and becomes laughably ridiculous. On other occasions, legitimate concerns can form a cacophony of doubt that overshadows underlying realities begging to be seen.

In the instance of LSU's Tyrann Mathieu, the "Honey Badger," there are a few factors that have led people to overlook the troubled defensive back. To begin with, he only measured 5'9" and 186 pounds at the combine, which is undersized for virtually any defensive position in the NFL. Secondly, he was unable to break a 4.5 40 time, suggesting that he lacks elite speed as well.

Then there's the game tape of Mathieu playing man coverage at corner, which isn't particularly impressive. He's not a lockdown corner, which is how players of his size often contribute.

Then there's the fact that Mathieu was kicked out of LSU for failing an unspecified number of drug tests, perhaps more than 10, and has spent his year off from football attempting to get clean and get his life back in order. Much like another collegiate star, he was became so dependent on marijuana as a coping mechanism for his life's problems that he lost his access to football, a potentially stabilizing force for good in his life.

Consequently, his whole game has come under scrutiny by teams and scouts eager to avoid the personal risks. Or in the case of the somewhat more clear-minded Bill Barnwell, his problems with marijuana were shrugged off while Barnwell hammered home criticism of his small size. A 5'9" player, Barnwell reasoned, shouldn't be expected to force as many fumbles in the NFL where players are so much larger, as he did in college. Nevermind that a player of Mathieu's size wouldn't be expected to force many fumbles in the SEC either, yet he did exactly that.

In reality, the best way to consider Tyrann Mathieu's pro prospects are with these questions: What are his skills, and do they translate to the NFL? To do that, we actually have to study Mathieu's history.

Tyrann Mathieu's coming out party occurred in the 2011 Cotton Bowl against Texas A&M after the 2010 season. Mathieu played in LSU's nickel package as a freshman that year and was on the field for much of that Cotton Bowl, to the detriment of the Aggies.

In that game he had seven tackles, one for loss, two forced fumbles, two break-ups, and an interception. His one tackle for loss came against Ryan Tannehill on the following play:

Mathieu began the play lined up near the #3 receiver to the field before sneaking towards the line and finally crouching down right before the snap almost like a defensive end.

In next year's draft, A&M's right tackle Jake Matthews will probably be drafted in the first round, potentially even in the top five. Here the long arms, quick feet, and base strength that will serve him well in the NFL are unavailing in getting his hands on Mathieu's tiny and quick frame.

When Mathieu reaches Tannehill, he shows the knack for finding the ball that would make him a Bednarik winner and Heisman finalist in 2011. He basically clotheslines Ryan Tannehill during his throwing motion and knocks the ball loose.

Mathieu's quickness and swiping arms made him a frightening weapon on edge blitzes and were possibly his most dangerous skills as a player. On tape, LSU frequently brought him off the edge in their Fire Zone blitzes. When Mathieu was unable to beat blockers off the ball, he wisely recognized that crashing his small body into an offensive lineman wouldn't help his team and would either leap into the passing lane or step away from the OL's block and find the ball.

If blockers could get their hands on him, his small size and lack of strength would become a problem and he'd be easily crushed ... if they could get their hands on him.

Mathieu's blitzing was available to LSU in its nickel package on defense, but when playing the Tigers' base 4-3 personnel, Mathieu was moved over to corner. Traditionally teams play their third-best corner in the nickel position, but the emergence of spread offenses have resulted in the expansion of the role into more than a third-down player.

Nevertheless, people often conceive of the nickel position as being more like the corner position than any other. The fact that Mathieu was technically a starting corner for LSU has done him no favors as he's been evaluated for that position in the NFL.

In this frame, Mathieu is playing the nickel position. Here he's lined up to the field just inside the No. 2 receiver six yards off the line of scrimmage.

While defensive coordinator John Chavis had a solid package of blitzes, which made for aggressive play calls, LSU's main M.O. was to play its secondary in soft coverage. All five of the defensive backs in the nickel package are now in the NFL and had both the physicality and athleticism to close on the ball in the open field.

What's important here is that the position played by Mathieu is basically a combination of the role that either a SAM linebacker or strong safety would have for a 4-3 defense. Depending on the play call, he's either defending the seam like a safety playing in a single high-safety defense, or he's covering the flat like a SAM linebacker in a 2-deep coverage.

For the offense it's difficult to tell which before the snap.

In this position Mathieu has run force responsibilities, meaning that he is to play the run outside in and leverage the runner back towards the middle of the field where the pursuit is coming.

The play is Oregon's "pin 'n' pull," which is basically an adapted version of the Wing T's "bucksweep" run. Like with Outside Zone, the offense is looking to beat the defense to the perimeter with the option for the back to cut upfield against the grain if LSU overpursues the play.

Mathieu wants to force the runner back inside as soon as possible, but he has to beat a block by a receiver much larger than himself.

As is often the case, the blocker is unable to get his hands on the lightning quick #7 and the edge is taken away from the speedy Oregon Ducks.

Mathieu cuts inside to help wrap up the Duck runner for a two yard loss on the play.

Chip Kelly's up-tempo spread at Oregon was really about spacing the defenders apart in order to succeed in the traditional goal of running up the middle. Mathieu's domination of the edge was so great in the game that he not only allowed LSU to leave six defenders in the box to handle all the interior gaps against the Duck run game, but he actually pushed Kelly to avoid attacking the wide side of the field in order to keep the ball away from him.

Against Alabama in round one of their season's matchup, Saban frequently used big formations that you might expect would expose Mathieu's lack of strength in ways that the speedy Oregon approach would not.

In this play they ran trips receivers bunched to the field side with a tight end the furthest back. Mathieu is lined up at corner outside of the no. 1 receiver with LSU in their 4-3 defensive package.

Alabama sends the two receivers vertical up the seam while the TE stays back as though to help in pass protection. Mathieu stays over the top of the receivers.

The no. 2 receiver keeps heading upfield while the no. 1 receiver cuts inside underneath the linebackers. Finally the TE releases to the flat which has been cleared by the other two receivers running vertically up the seam. In this coverage, Mathieu is still responsible for the field side.

When McCarron sets his feet to throw, Mathieu is safely 12 yards away from the TE in the flat.

By the time the ball is arriving, #7 has already cut the distance in half and is closing on the much larger TE.

The play goes for a two yard gain but it's not until Mathieu is three yards behind the line of scrimmage that he relents in driving the TE backwards and buries him deeply into the Bryant-Denny Stadium grass.

Here, Mathieu was playing corner but the skills that set him up for success involved maintaining leverage in zone, recognition, and then closing on the ball to make a physical tackle. In most defenses, these are the skills teams look for in a safety. As it happens, injuries to LSU over the course of the year forced Mathieu to fill the position of Free Safety in a crucial showdown with the then no. 3 ranked Arkansas Razorbacks.

With the game tied, Mathieu is lined up 13 yards deep on the boundary hash as the free safety. Arkansas is facing 2nd and inches after a physical Mathieu tackle cut a receiver down just shy of the marker on first down. Arkansas struggled to run the ball consistently against LSU, largely because successful run plays often turned out as this one did.

On an inside zone, running back #33 is cutting back into a crease in the LSU defense enabled by the strong safety's mistackle occuring in this frame. Mathieu's responsibility on this play was to play as the deepest defender and watch for play-action over the top, a common threat on second-and-short.

After the back cuts upfield, Mathieu has already arrived in support. He potentially saved a few touchdowns in this game in his role as a back-end eraser on the few Arkansas runs that managed to break through the LSU fronts.

Despite being only 5'9", 185 pounds, Tyrann Mathieu hits the running back high and prevents a first down run from being a drive-making play. What's more, he actually rips the ball out of the back's hands and ends the drive with a crucial turnover.

Mathieu finished the game with two forced fumbles and a touchdown on an electrifying kick return that demonstrated his tremendous quickness and change of direction.

Putting the whole package together you have a player who is a physical tackler, has ball-hawking skills, is an adept blitzer, dominated some of the game's most athletic offenses in the open field, and was able as a true sophomore in college to handle playing corner, nickel, and free safety with all of the assignments and duties that fell to each position.

If you put it all together in one play and you'll find sequences like this:

Against Oregon's up-tempo offense, LSU is still getting set and Mathieu is at the first down marker slowly ambling towards his nickel alignment on the no. 2 receiver. From his movements, you'd guess that Mathieu isn't sure what the defensive call is on this play.

When he reaches his nickel alignment he suddenly turns upfield and runs at the line of scrimmage.

Oregon is running the famous zone read, in which the offense leaves the backside DE unblocked, and the QB decides to hand the ball off or keep it and take the edge based on if the DE chases the back or stays "home" to stop the QB.

Seeing Mathieu screaming off the edge, Darron Thomas says "you take this..." and allows the running back to attempt to find yards against the teeth of a field scrape Fire Zone blitz.

Already having ruined Darron Thomas' read, Mathieu is still able to come off the edge and assist in making the tackle on the running back behind the line of scrimmage.

Mathieu's ability to handle numerous assignments, close and tackle well, and fly around the field before the snap call to mind another shorter player who has had some degree of success in the NFL, Troy Polamalu.

Now, Polamalu is about 20 pounds heavier, and ran a 4.4 flat at the NFL Combine. But many of the comparisons are still stark. Similarly, Bob Sanders was arguably the best defensive player on the 2007 Super Bowl champion Indianapolis Colts team but stood at only 5'8" 205 and found success due to his extraordinary quickness and fearlessness in run support.

The Arizona Cardinals seem to be sharing these comparisons, and announced that Mathieu would start at Free Safety. In today's more spread out and option heavy NFL, it doesn't pay to overlook a player that dominated such attacks in college with his tackling and nose for the football simply because he isn't as tall or heavy as you might like.

When a player like Mathieu can play in so many different roles on the field, it's silly to worry about teams picking on his weaknesses. To pick on Mathieu's short stature in coverage you have to know who he's covering. If he's jumping around in the backfield like Polamalu before dropping into a zone, manning up a receiver, or blitzing how do you target his weaknesses?

Indeed, instead of finding a way to exploit him teams may be desperate to know what he's up to so he won't ruin their best laid plans as he did for so many collegiate offenses. As long as teams understand to play him in the middle of the field in unpredictable roles rather than outside at corner, he can continue to shock larger opponents with his physicality and nose for the ball.

In evaluating either the world at large, or players in the NFL draft, you can choose pessimistic cynicism and discount people, or you can look to see what's good and what might be possible.

Of course critics are free to discount Tyrann Mathieu if they like. It will make no difference, Honey Badger don't care...

Jarvis Jones and the Pittsburgh Steeler linebacker tradition

2013-05-02T13:00:03Z

Although the term has come to define the entire Pittsburgh defensive tradition, the original "Steel Curtain" nickname was actually applied for the defensive line that was anchored by "mean" Joe Greene and helped the Steelers capture Superbowl championships in 1975, 1976, 1979, and 1980.

However, playing behind that line was the linebacker trio of Jack Ham, Jack Lambert, and Andy Russell. Ham is considered one of the greatest outside linebackers of all time, while Lambert was the first "Tampa-2" middle linebacker, who dropped into the deep middle of the field on a regular basis a few decades before Steeler assistant coach Tony Dungy and Monte Kiffin popularized the tactic in the late-1990s.

In turn, Dungy had an assistant coach at Tampa Bay by the name of Mike Tomlin, the current head coach of the Pittsburgh Steelers. However, the Steel Curtain defense that Tomlin inherited in Pittsburgh was no longer the 4-3 defense developed under Chuck Noll. Instead, the Steelers had come to be defined by the 3-4 defense that Bill Cowher installed and that Hall of Fame coach Dick Lebeau had transformed.

Since the 3-4 was brought to Pitsburgh in the 90's, the Steel Curtain defense has been known primarily for the play of its linebackers, with respect to defensive linemen like Aaron Smith or Casey Hampton, and defensive back stars Ike Troy Polamalu.

Originally Greg Lloyd and Levon Kirkland dominated offenses, then Chad Brown and Kevin Greene defined the legacy. Later in the late-90's and early-00's, Joey Porter's pass rushing on the outside and James Farrior's play inside defined the Steeler defense. When Joey Porter was allowed to walk, the Steelers quickly plugged in an undrafted free agent named James Harrison, who was named Defensive Player of the Year in 2008 for the Steelers' second Super Bowl championship of the decade.

Now James Harrison is moving on, and all eyes in the city of Pittsburgh are on returning players like Lamarr Woodley, Jason Worilds, and incoming rookie Jarvis Jones. But before we examine the potential impact of Jarvis Jones, it's worth unpacking how exactly the Steelers have been able to plug'n'play different linebackers into their defense.

Since LeBeau came back to Pittsburgh in 2004 they've ranked in the top 10 of Football Outsiders' DVOA rankings every year save for in 2012 (finished 13th), finished in the top five in five of those nine seasons, and finished first twice. Their track record of brilliance with different linebackers plugged into the system is a remarkable feat.

It's not enough to point to the 3-4 scheme, as much of the league has also built around that formation. Nor does LeBeau's status as architect of the Zone Blitz really stand out, as almost every football team at every level of the game now uses the concept.

In reality, the reason for the Steelers' prolonged defensive dominance and linebacker excellence is the combination of the organization's systemic strength, LeBeau's constant innovation, and the Steeler defense's focus on versatility.

In 2013, the Steelers got 15 sacks out of their three main outside linebackers (Harrison, Woodley, Worilds) and another 10 sacks from their inside linebacker combo of Larry Foote and Lawrence Timmons. Unlike many other styles of 3-4 defense around the league, the Steeler outside linebackers aren't strictly pass-rushers like Dallas' DeMarcus Ware or a player like Mario Williams.

Here's what Woodley told SI's Peter King:

"I was a 4-3 end at Michigan, and I think I dropped into coverage six times," Woodley says. "When I got here, I knew they were drafting me to pressure the quarterback, and I didn't know why they'd want me to drop back.

"But I drop back 40, 50 percent of the time now, and I see why. The tackle doesn't know what I'm doing, and it keeps me fresh. If you're not rushing, not righting with someone, you're running with a receiver."

In their base 3-4 defense, the Steelers will generally respond to offensive formations like this:

Woodley is standing up on the top over Dallas' Tight End Jason Witten, while Harrison is on the lower hash, presenting himself as a threat to either drop out in coverage over the slot receiver or blitz off the edge.

Even in the Steelers' basic Cover-3 schemes, it's very difficult for the Cowboys OL to determine whether Woodley or Harrison will be the 4th pass rusher trying to bring down Tony Romo. It'd be nice to think that free safety Ryan Clark's deep position and the tight coverage on the outside receivers would clearly indicate Cover-1, but the tandem of Polamalu and Clark are every bit the masters of disguise that Woodley and Harrison can be on the line.

Late before the snap Harrison has snuck much closer to the line of scrimmage, too close to maintain his responsibilities on the #2 receiver in LeBeau's "Seam" pattern-match coverage technique. So Harrison is the fourth rusher, right?

The ball is snapped, and both Woodley and Harrison are starting to backpedal into coverage, meanwhile inside backers Timmons and Foote are firing at the line of scrimmage in one of LeBeau's dreaded inside zone blitzes.

Harrison is assuming the shallow middle of field coverage responsibilities, while Woodley and Polamalu are the Seam players. The defensive ends have come outside to draw OL help, clear space in the middle, and contain Romo in the pocket.

Soon Timmons and Foote are loose up the middle and Romo manages to hit the outside receiver (Austin) to the top left with an extremely trusting comeback throw that barely beats former practice squad corner James Victorian, who was thrust into action by injuries. A lesser QB than Romo would have surely been flattened.

Harrison was a very dangerous pass-rusher, and had three consecutive 10-sack seasons from 2008-2010. Woodley also had at least 10 sacks in the exact same years. However, the Steelers' defense achieves extreme production from its outside linebacker positions without sending them crashing into the OL all the time, but by attacking pass protections with all four linebackers (and with the safeties as well) coming from different angles at different times.

To achieve that kind of unpredictability, all four linebackers have to understand their coverage assignments in the base defenses, the different underneath coverage assignments in the zone-blitzes, and how to effectively pass-rush. Then there are their roles and duties on running plays. Versatility and intelligence is the name of the game in Pittsburgh.

Enter Jarvis Jones. In Georgia's 3-4 defense, the linebacker was virtually never asked to handle any responsibilities against the pass save for "get the quarterback," a role in which he excelled.

Jones had 14.5 sacks in his senior season with Georgia and usually lined up outside over tight ends, as he will in Pittsburgh, as well as over offensive tackles in nickel and dime packages, which he will also be asked to do in the NFL.

In the roles that Jones was asked to perform, he excelled. Against Alabama in the SEC Championship game his pass-rushing dominance limited how the Crimson Tide could attack the Bulldogs with the pass game.

The Bulldogs have him lined up as a 9-tech here, outside of the TE. Alabama has three receivers on the field and are in the shotgun, indicating a likely passing play.

They send the TE past Jones on a route, leaving first round draft pick D.J. Fluker, the right tackle, to deal with Jones in pass protection. However, they have their RB ready to pick up Jones if he beats Fluker, essentially ignoring any other potential pass-rushing threat.

Fluker flails to the ground attempting to cut off Jones' speed rush and the running back is forced to pick him up to prevent pressure.

Jones is slightly off balance as he careens into the running back, who attempts to shield him from reaching A.J. McCarron. However, McCarron pump fakes here, seeing the break the defender has on the short crossing route he's considering.

That extra instant caused by the pump fake is all that Jarvis Jones needs to blow inside past the running back and slam into McCarron from behind, leading him to drop the ball.

Even with extra protection and future NFL tackles like Fluker and Cyrus Kouandjio, Alabama was unable to protect McCarron from Jarvis Jones in this game, and he had two sacks. Fortunately for Nick Saban, the middle of the Georgia defense could not withstand the Warmack-Jones blocking duo, and Alabama ran up the middle all night long en route to their tight victory.

As a perimeter run defender, Jones also demonstrated elite athleticism and play-making skill over the course of the year and accumulated 24.5 tackles for loss. Against Florida, whom Jones absolutely decimated, he found himself in a situation he will frequently face in Pittsburgh.

Georgia is aligned much like Pittsburgh's base defense with the DE's lined up over the tackles and Jarvis Jones outside over the Gator TE.

Florida brings the receiver on bottom in motion across the formation as a potential sweeper. As a result of this motion, the Georgia defenders have to freeze in case they will have to chase him down on the perimeter. Meanwhile, the right guard is pulling back to Jones along with the fullback.

Jarvis follows "block down step down" rules and comes inside to eliminate a crease opening up between the TE he was lined up across and himself. Because the Georgia linebackers had to honor the WR sweep, they are a step behind in trying to beat the pullers' to the outside on the running play. It's essential that Jones blow up the block and spill the play outside so that the Georgia defenders have time to chase it down.

Jones steps inside perfectly to take on the block but the Georgia inside backers are walled off by the TE. The intention of Florida is for the guard to blast Jones out so the fullback can come inside and drive the safety or a linebacker out of the way. The hope for Georgia is that Jones can blow up the guard's block and free up the safety to chase down the running back on the edge.

But notice that Jones has just taken a step inside with his right foot...

He greets the pulling guard with a spin move. Not only has he closed off the intended inside lane for Florida's Counter run, but he's also cut off the inside path for the fullback who is now stacked uselessly in the backfield.

Jones then spins off the guard and hits the Florida running back three yards behind the line of scrimmage, single-handedly turning a big potential gain into a loss for the Gator offense.

This kind of speed and athleticism on the perimeter will serve Jones well in Pittsburgh, where he will be asked to take on pullers, fullbacks, and tight ends routinely on the edge both against the run and the pass. The remaining questions are in regards to how he handles the pass defense of the Steelers, which is heavy on communication and often plays out like a basketball defense shouting out instructions in responding to a pick'n'roll.

If LeBeau and the Pittsburgh staff can maintain their excellent tradition of training athletic pass-rushers to become well-rounded in their defense, it's very likely that the name of Jarvis Jones will take its place with the others in the Steeler linebacker tradition.

2013 NFL Draft profiles: Ezekiel Ansah

2013-04-24T14:11:46Z

Professional drafts often make clowns out of scouts and GMs as they take big gambles with high draft picks in search of talent that will blossom into game-changing performers. With the move to prime time Thursday night, the 2012 NFL draft took in 25.3 million viewers. The 2013 draft could exceed those numbers and shine an even greater spotlight on the decisions of teams in shaping their future teams.

At the same time as the draft has become a major television event, the introduction of rookie pay scales has totally changed the nature of the beast for ball clubs. The combination of greater spotlight and smaller salaries for the draft choices can have a variety of effects on teams' choices. It could encourage them to feel less pressure to find game changers with first round picks and take advantage of the affordable contracts to stock their teams with safe commodities...or it could empower teams to take chances on unproven talent without the risk of sinking tens of millions in guaranteed money on busts.

On the surface, Ezekiel Ansah comes across much like the latter kind of player. At the NFL Combine he presented raw, untapped potential measuring at 6'5, 270 pounds. In the tests, he managed to propel that massive form 34.5 inches straight up into the air and across 40 yards of field in only 4.63 seconds.

NFL scouts immediately compared him to Jason Pierre-Paul, who ran the 40 in 4.67 seconds at 6-4, 270. Pierre-Paul was plugged into the New York Giants pass-rush heavy DL in 2010 and has produced 27.5 sacks in three seasons, including 16.5 in their championship season in 2011.

The evolving nature of NFL passing offenses and the tremendous threat posed by teams with elite QB play make a defensive line that can get a consistent pass-rush extremely valuable to GMs. Both of the New York Giants' championships were achieved largely because they had a healthy and unblockable defensive line in their playoff runs, which ruined the advantages enjoyed by teams with great passing attacks, like Green Bay and New England.

So it would seem that Ezekiel Ansah could become the centerpiece of a ruinous defense that thwarts everything that NFL offenses are trying to accomplish by keeping players like Tom Brady scrambling for their lives rather than hitting receivers downfield. However, although his senior season came out of nowhere and shocked BYU's competition, his pass-rush numbers are not awe inspiring. He had 4.5 sacks on the season and 13 tackles for loss.

The nature of his career, having not played football before coming to college and having not actually dominated the field in college as a pass-rush DE, seems to point to Ansah's future in the NFL as being a boom or bust prospect. But when we examine what Ansah actually did in college, we find that his projection as Jason Pierre-Paul The Second is actually a limited vision for what he could become in the NFL.

Let's begin with his role in the BYU Cougars 41-17 blowout victory over Georgia Tech.

Georgia Tech's offense is geared around running triple-option plays from the flexbone formation. The triple-option is designed to threaten a defensive front at multiple points. First, the quick-hitting dive up the gut by the fullback, then the potential for the QB to run up the seam or pitch it outside to a blazing speedster who can take the corner.

Against the triple-option, BYU primarily deployed Ansah in two ways. First, in a typical role as the strongside DE in a 3-4 scheme, he was asked to beat the offensive tackle's block and eliminate running creases up the middle while freeing up the linebackers to make plays.

One important feature of the Georgia Tech offense is the wide splits by the OL. Much like Mike Leach's Air Raid, Paul Johnson uses wide spacing to create big running creases up the gut. Leach does this to simplify pass protection and create throwing lanes, while Georgia Tech attacks the creases with fullback dives. Ansah is highlighted here for you as the strongside DE lined up across from the Right Tackle.

Georgia Tech's OL is using outside zone blocking here to run a classic triple-option play. The first read is up the middle of the A or B gap with the quick handoff to the fullback. The back to the top is looking to block for the pitch and the QB, if he doesn't give to the fullback, will cut inside the back's block or pitch outside to the back trailing him.

Already we see that the right tackle's attempt to reach Ansah and seal him inside is going terribly. Ansah immediately recognized the play design and has danced outside where the OT cannot reach him. At this point, his role is normally to squeeze the OT inside and close two gaps. To close the inside gap with the OT's own body smashed against the guard's body, and to fill the outside gap with Ansah's arms.

The OT releases inside of Ansah and looks to block the next level defender but Ansah's positioning and collision of his trajectory is going to make it impossible for the OT to reach the linebacker, no. 4, who is flying outside. Now, Ansah's 4.6 speed comes into play as the QB read the inside stunt by the BYU linebacker and is keeping the ball.

Ansah cuts off the QB's potential lane up the seam, both because he is well-positioned to out-leverage the play and because he's faster than the QB. The QB has to pitch now to a pitch man who has barely entered the play. The blocking back has a good angle on no. 5 but linebacker no. 4 has a clear path to the pitchman because Ansah didn't allow the OT to get the necessary angle to reach him.

The linebacker almost reaches the pitch at the same time as the back and easily makes the tackle for a four yard loss. This was all set up by Ansah handling the speed and wide splits of the Georgia Tech OL and having the strength to stand-up and shed the OT. On other plays in the game he was able to stand up the OT and shove him inside to eliminate the creases before tackling the fullback from behind with his quickness.

The other way that BYU deployed Ansah was on quick stunts to the inside.

Against the same formation, BYU is lined up in the same manner.

This time the outside linebacker is filling outside while Ansah cuts inside into the B gap. The right guard seems blissfully unaware that Ansah is coming inside and the OT's outside step means he has zero chance of even touching Ansah.

When the QB and the fullback make their first meshing point, Ansah is already almost to the ball. Due either to the success of the OL in driving back the nose tackle and middle linebacker, or the QB reading the outside linebacker's leverage to take away the QB and pitch man, the QB still hands off to the fullback.

Ansah immediately flattens the fullback behind the line of scrimmage before looking up to check the QB, almost as if to say "surely this poor fool didn't have the ball, did he?" I'm not sure if any offensive player took a worse or more humiliating beating than Georgia Tech's fullback at the hands of Ezekiel Ansah over the course of the game.

Against the more power-oriented run game of the Notre Dame Fighting Irish, Ansah finished with six tackles in a narrow 17-14 defeat that made people question whether Notre Dame had the offense to hang with college football's better teams. Of course, a big reason for the struggles of the Irish was dealing with a dominant but mostly still unheard-of defensive end.

Looking back now, Ansah's 4.5 sacks becomes far more understandable when you consider the role of his position against teams like Notre Dame where he frequently had jobs like this:

He's aligned heads-up against the Irish right tackle.

Notre Dame double teams Ansah with RG 57 and RT 74 with the goal of driving him off the line of scrimmage and creating a running lane for their back, no. 6 Theo Riddick.

When Riddick reaches the point where he needs to make his decision about where to cut on this zone play this is what he's confronted with: a wall of bodies. A massive pile-up caused by the fact that Ansah has not been moved backwards a single yard.

Somehow Riddick slipped through that mass of bodies without landing on his knee and emerged on other side against a shocked Cougar defense, but we can't blame this on Ansah, who stood up a double team.

Critics would love to point out the lack of tape in which Ansah beats NFL quality tackles for sacks but circumstances in BYU's 2012 season didn't really create such opportunities. BYU plays a 3-4 defense in which his role was as a DE who was expected to get low and dirty with the OL and free up linebackers to make plays. What's more, BYU's toughest opponents in 2012 were as follows: Utah (Ansah wasn't playing yet), Boise State (breakout game by Ansah), Oregon State, Notre Dame, and Georgia Tech.

Most of those teams are primarily known for running the ball, yet when we saw Ansah have the opportunity to utilize his speed and athleticism, he took full advantage.

Here against Boise St, Ansah reveals what is currently his best pass-rush move, the quick stunt inside.

BYU actually lines him up as NFL teams are eager to do: as a stand-up weakside pass rusher.

Boise State is running play-action and BYU is blitzing. The nickel back near the top of the screen is coming down on an outside blitz while Ansah stunts inside of the OT against the guard. The left tackle realizes what is happening and steps outside to meet the blitz but he is able to do little to help the guard block Ansah.

Ansah immediately drives the hapless guard backwards and is leveraged to get inside of him in a moment. By this point, Ansah has gone from the C-gap to the A-gap in almost an instant and is six yards deep into the backfield.

Boise's QB, Joe Southwick, realizes Ansah is too far inside but also nearly on top of him and spins outside to get away and buy time. But Ansah responds to the spin move and is in already in pursuit, the guard left behind to wonder at what has happened while attempting to regain his footing.

Southwick just barely gets the ball away before Ansah is driving him into the blue turf. Again, Ansah is faster than nearly all of the QBs in the NFL, and his quick feet and long strides often allow him to outmaneuver faster players in space as well.

NFL scouts see Ansah's lightning quick reflexes, his quick footwork, and his ability to cover ground and are eager to deploy him on the edge. However, watching his college tape you also see physicality against the run game, ability to navigate the trenches, and long arms which suggest another potential comparison: J.J. Watt.

The Houston Texans' 6-5, 295 pound defensive end dominated the league in 2012, with 20.5 sacks and 16 pass deflections. Ask any Big 12 defensive coordinator how to stop the quick passing games of spread offenses and they will emphasize to you the need to get an interior pass rush and hands up in the B-gap. J.J. Watt accomplished that for the Texans and dominated their competition. For a team that is willing to be inventive, Ansah could accomplish something similar. The team that drafts him could do all of the following:

1. Play him on the edge as a stand-up rusher. Much like San Francisco's Aldon Smith, Ansah could drop into short coverage, take the edge in the pass-rush or drive blockers into the QB, or stunt inside.

2. Play him inside as a 3-4 End or 3-tech D. He could stunt outside, beat guards heads-up with his pass-rush, and get his hands up to deflect passes if he can't reach the QB.

3. Play him at nose tackle in pass-rush situations. He can get a steady push inside with his strength or do unexpected things that normal nose tackles cannot accomplish like stunt outside or drop into coverage.

As with Tavon Austin, the mistake with Ansah would be to put him into a box, in this case thinking of him as the ideal 4-3 defensive end and failing to use him on other parts of the field. There aren't too many people in the world that are this big, this athletic, and this skilled at the traits that define great football players.

His long arms, power, quick reactions, and speed can make him a weapon all over the field. Just as BYU found a few different ways of using Ansah to destroy the Georgia Tech triple-option, inventive defensive coordinators should be able to find ways to use Ansah to destroy any number of different blocking schemes and play concepts.

Ezekiel Ansah's combination of pass-rush potential and run-stuffing tape should land him as one of the top 5 picks of the draft. Then it's up to the drafting team to convert all that talent into a weapon that will thwart any and all of what NFL offenses are trying to do.

2013 NFL Draft profiles: Arthur Brown

2013-04-16T20:41:45Z

When you hear traditionalist NFL commentators and coaches discuss the influence of the "spread option" on the game, exemplified by the 2012-13 explosion of the zone read play and pistol formation, there is often a great deal of scorn for the notion that option-oriented offenses could be successful in the NFL.

Of course, in reality, option offenses have been dominant in the NFL for decades now. Bill Walsh's West Coast offense was built around the QB making quick reads and decisions with the ball, just like in college football's Wishbone offense. While the ball is tossed forward in the NFL, option reads by the QB are an important part of the game.

The Big 12 continued its marriage of those innovations in 2012 with offensive concepts that asked quarterbacks to make quick decisions that included both run and throw options on the same play.

Good football defenses have always depended on athletic players and a phalanx type mindset in which everyone depends on his teammate to do their job while he does his own. However, the modern option-heavy offenses are so good at finding the weak spots in coverages and defensive fronts that these tenets of good defensive play have been stressed to the max.

A good defense must now consist of players who understand their roles, execute, and THEN possess the awareness and speed to track the ball. Against an offense that makes good reads, if you've done your job there's a good chance the play is occurring somewhere else and you need to get there quick.

Of course, the nature of spread offenses is also such that fulfilling your first assignment on defense often requires great athleticism in order to cover the amount of space that the offense makes you account for.

The traditional linebacker is one of the primary victims of all these innovations. One of the first run/throw option plays that has been introduced is the Inside Zone/Bubble screen. Plays like this challenge a defense on how they will account for the possibility of the ball attacking them on the flank or up the gut. A linebacker often has the responsibility to pursue the screen, but if he does so then he must vacate his interior gap, which is being attacked by a combo-block and inside run.

This is the world into which Arthur Brown was thrust when he transferred to Kansas St. and was made the starting middle linebacker in 2011. At 6'0" and around 230 pounds, Brown did not match the ideal body-type of a classic middle linebacker. However, he does possess the stocky and quick traits of legendary Tampa-2 linebackers like Jack Ham, London Fletcher, or Derrick Brooks, who excelled in the tasks that modern linebackers undertake.

While many Big 12 defenses would remove linebackers to match four and five wide receiver formations by the offense, Kansas State always left Arthur Brown on the field:

Here against Baylor, Brown is technically the Mike linebacker but he's several yards outside of the box being asked to play out in space between the slot receiver and OL.

Here against an empty set with five wide receivers by West Virginia they still have Arthur Brown on the field. Because they could trust Arthur Brown to hold his own on the field against spread sets, they were able to play the same base nickel personnel against all manner of offensive formations.

That paid big dividends in the form of the overall discipline and cohesiveness of the KSU phalanx, and in the physical run defense that came from having Arthur Brown on the field at all times.

West Virginia was totally thwarted by Kansas St's defensive tactics in their 2012 matchup on October the 20th in Morgantown. Where Oklahoma and their dime and dollar defensive packages were abused, Kansas St. put on a 55-14 rout. Brown led the way with eight tackles, two behind the line of scrimmage, an interception, and a knockdown of Geno Smith on a blitz.

West Virginia came into the game looking to attack the Wildcats' linebacker corps, and in their second offensive drive brought out a 20 personnel package (2 running backs, 0 tight ends) to attack KSU inside out with an inside zone/bubble screen play.

At this point, West Virginia's defense has really struggled to contain Collin Klein and the KSU offense, and a score is essential. Arthur Brown (no. 4) is in the field-side B gap and the 2nd linebacker from the top. West Virginia already has Kansas State outnumbered in the box with five OL and two RB's vs four DL and two LB.

West Virginia motions the boundary-side running back to the field. The response by Kansas State will reveal their coverage and defense. If a linebacker chased the running back out, it would indicate a man-coverage. Instead, the weakside KSU linebacker slides over and Arthur Brown slides out of the tackle box.

The initial read for QB Geno Smith is to see if the defense has been out-leveraged by the quick screen. Since Brown, the nickel back, and safety behind them have shifted outside to prevent getting beat to the edge, the weak spot in the defense is in the B-gap where Arthur Brown had been stationed. It's quickly opening up into a massive crease.

However, Arthur Brown demonstrates his sideline to sideline speed and is back in the crease before the running back even reaches the line of scrimmage. Now it remains for Brown to handle the back's cut in the massive space afforded by West Virginia's motion plus defensive end no. 42 rushing hard up field.

Brown manages to get his legs and bring him down for an only two yard gain.

West Virginia used motion to try and outflank the Wildcats on the perimeter with the true intention of opening up the middle of the field to be gashed by inside zone. Kansas State responded by sliding their defensive backfield over to prevent getting leveraged, sent their DE's flying upfield to try and funnel the ball back inside, and then relied on Arthur Brown's quickness and tackling to control the middle of the field.

The game proceeded with KSU staying in good leverage against West Virginia's attempts to spread them out and hammer either the perimeter or interior while Collin Klein was giving Holgorsen's Air Raiders a quick death with downfield strikes that added up to 333 passing yards.

Coming back after halftime down 31-7 (only score coming on a Tavon Austin kick return), West Virginia tried to punish Kansas State's aggressive pursuit of their inside/outside concepts by throwing over the top.

They bring back the 20 personnel formation with the boundary-side running back motioning to the field to threaten KSU with both the screen and the inside zone run yet again.

Kansas St. responds in the same fashion with Arthur Brown sliding out of the tackle box and the nickel back sliding out so that he can play with outside leverage on the slot receiver.

Arthur Brown and the nickel have their eyes to the backfield to be ready to respond to the running play.

But it's a play-action fake, and Geno Smith is looking for the no. 2 receiver who had appeared to be blocking for the screen. Both the nickel and Brown immediately recognize what's happening and look to get depth as quickly as possible.

You can see the West Virginia receiver on bottom nestled between the underneath coverage and the deep defenders. The nickel back no. 15 tips the ball up and Arthur Brown has already arrived.

The Corner had stayed shallow to defend the no. 1 receiver and the safety has just arrived over the top but there was a window in the defense to hit the receiver for what would have been at least a 15 yard gain. Unfortunately for the Mountaineers, the nickel and mike backers for KSU were able to take deep enough drops in time to deflect the pass.

Naturally Arthur Brown intercepts the ball after the deflection and the game is essentially over. It's 31-7, KSU has the ball inside the West Virginia 30 yard line, and Dana Holgorsen's counter to KSU's disciplined pursuit of their gameplan has just blown up in his face.

The distance that Brown covered in these two plays and his diagnosis of spacing attacks demonstrates his great potential value for NFL teams that have to deal with misdirection and subtle gameplanning on a weekly basis.

BUT! cries the NFL scout. While the NFL is employing more and more of these college spread concepts, they still aren't running the Air Raid. Linebackers still have to fill gaps, take on blockers, and bring people down in confined space.

While power running wasn't necessarily West Virginia's forte, the Mountaineers did employ some classic smashmouth football tactics against Arthur Brown, as did much of the league. Here's an example of a typical outcome from that approach:

Needing a yard early in the game, WV came out with two receivers, a fullback, a halfback, and a running back. Holgorsen introduced these kinds of loaded backfield formations at Oklahoma St., which allowed the offense to send blocking numbers to unexpected parts of the formation. KSU responded with a sort of 4-3 Under front with Brown taking the traditional Mike role of filling the "bubble" in the defense.

There is no DL lined up over the right guard, providing the offense with a "bubble" to attack by sending that guard to the 2nd level. Ideally the nose will require on a double from the guard and center and leave the Mike the role of blowing up the fullback to allow the weakside linebacker or free safety to make the tackle. This is the job duty of a classic mike.

West Virginia runs Power into the B-gap, the classic smashmouth approach. The right guard does indeed help the center double team the nose tackle and leaves Arthur Brown for the fullback while the halfback ventures outside to stop the outside linebacker from caving in the play from the edge.

From the camera behind the line of scrimmage you can see Brown leveraging himself into the hole before the fullback is there. The obvious crease would come behind the fullback's demolition of the smaller Brown in the hole.

But Brown gets lower than the fullback and leads into him from the ground up using his right shoulder so that his left is free to play the running back. Looking carefully, you can actually see the fullback's feet leave the ground on tape after the impact.

Arthur Brown sheds the fullback with relative ease and gets his hands on the running back on the wrong side of the intended hole.

He makes the tackle two yards behind the line of scrimmage and forces a West Virginia punt that leads to KSU's quick momentum in the game.

Granted this play came against the spread-oriented West Virginia and not against Vonta Leach and Ray Rice, but the physicality of Brown and great fundamentals are still evident.

At the combine, Brown measured at 240 pounds while running a 4.65 40. His low center of gravity and great knee bend in his stances and approach to blocks and ballcarriers gave him the needed power to play in the box while his speeds allows him to reach the box from alignments that are intended to take away passing lanes for the offense.

Where he fits in the NFL will depend on the scheme. Most scouts have him pegged as an outside linebacker who can pursue plays laterally behind the protection of inside backers and defensive lineman. There is no doubt that his horizontal pursuit speed would allow him to excel in that role. However, against West Virginia we saw Kansas St. task Brown with maintaining control of the middle of the field and the results speak for themselves.

West Virginia threw the ball for 155 yards in 35 attempts, a total of 4.4 yards per attempt. Tavon Austin, who normally abuses the middle of a defense's coverage, gained only 34 receiving yards on the day. West Virginia ran the ball for 88 yards on 27 carries, a total of only 3.3 yards per carry.

An NFL team that values linebackers who can make deep drops against the pass, pursue the ball all over the field, and still have the tenacity and strength to mix it up in the tackle box will snatch up Arthur Brown. Much like the "undersized" Tampa-2 defenses of the early 00's, this team will be better equipped than most to handle the spread-option attacks headed their way.

2013 NFL Draft profiles: Tavon Austin

2013-04-10T14:49:44Z

In the week leading up to their November 17th showdown with new conference foe West Virginia, the brothers Stoops of Oklahoma undertook the crafting of perhaps the most challenging gameplan to that point of the season: how to stop Tavon Austin.

Coming back to Oklahoma for the 2012 season, Mike Stoops approached the rapidly evolving spread offenses of the Big 12 differently than his predecessor and former partner Brent Venables. Right in discerning that offensive coordinators were scheming to create matchup advantages for their best players, usually explosive players like Austin, Stoops responded by trying to build a relatively matchup-proof defense. His plan was to use man coverage to deny easy throws to blazing receivers and use his experienced safety tandem (Tony Jefferson and Javon Harris) to clean up completed passes and runs.

In order to successfully play man coverage against Big 12 teams that frequently played four wide receivers, Stoops had to play Nickel/Dime defense extensively so that he could match speed with speed and avoid compromising his safeties' run support with the need to help linebackers cover slot receivers.

However, when it came to matching up his personnel against Tavon Austin, Stoops made a category error, an error that much of the football commentariat and even Austin's coach, Dana Holgorsen, had been making. He classified Tavon Austin as a wide receiver and gameplanned to keep him matched up against a defensive back.

Much of the football world has become overly caught up in formations and positional definitions to the point that we've lost sight of what it means to be a "receiver," particularly in contrast to what it means to be a "running back." Consider the designation of "fullback." At one time this player was lined up "fully" behind the QB in the offensive backfield. Today, when we think of fullbacks we think of squatty blockers that crouch in front of the running back and lead the way for him. We could really stand to create new terms for many of these positions.

Spread offenses have particularly wreaked havoc on football's classic terminology and positional duties. What position would we say Tavon Austin is playing here?

Technically since he's out "wide" (third from the top) and perhaps most likely to obtain possession of the ball via a toss from the QB, we call him a wide receiver. Yet in defensive terms, as the no. 3 receiver from the sideline, he's assigned to a linebacker in most coverages like a running back would be.

The latter point is part of the cunning of spread coordinators like Holgorsen, who make their living by asking linebackers to try and cover people like Austin in space. What does it profit an OC to have the fastest player on the field and allow him to be covered by the fastest player on the defense?

The real key in evaluating the essence of a position is this: What is the main occupation and skill required to be a receiver? I would argue that a receiver's primary talent needs to be in presenting targets for the Quarterback that will lead to scores. The emphasis is on receiving, the primary skill set is in how the player obtains possession.

Tavon Austin is a solid receiver. By virtue of his ludicrous speed (4.28 40 time), he can cut in and out of breaks with terrifying quickness and precision. However, he's also about 5'8" and easy to jam or cover up with taller, more physical players. West Virginia QB Geno Smith often had to be especially accurate to hit the windows downfield that would get the ball in Austin's hands. In particular, one of Austin's best routes was to break outside after running up the seam as an inside receiver.

Defenders struggled to prevent Austin from getting separation on his break, but the resulting window and outside throw that Smith would have to make was difficult and fraught with peril. Here's an example of Austin running an out route matched by Oklahoma's dimeback Julian Wilson, a versatile 6-2 player.

Austin is no. 3 from the top. It looks like Cover-1 coverage by Oklahoma, but Wilson's inside leverage on Austin says something else.

Austin begins by attacking the seam, and since Oklahoma is actually in Cover-2, Wilson has to protect the seam and force Austin back outside.

Austin breaks outside and Geno is already delivering the ball with Wilson trailing behind.

Wilson's length almost deflects the pass, while more awareness from #14 Aaron Colvin could have lead to a big hit or play on the ball from behind as well.

Quarterbacks like Peyton Manning and Tom Brady can routinely make these throws, but hitting small windows to the outside to short receivers is not a great gameplan for sustainable success in the NFL and just barely beats the strong OU secondary here.

**********

Conversely, what are the defining features of a running back? Primarily, his skill with the ball already in his hands. Most plays that feature the running back don't require a great deal of effort to get the ball into his hands. Instead, they focus on setting him up for success after the delivery has been made.

The innovation of the spread is that, more than setting up the ball-carrier with running lanes created by blocks, they set him up with space in which to operate. Spreading out the defense helps an offense pinpoint where the defense is poorly aligned or leveraged and susceptible to being flanked or over-stressed. In particular, the spread really challenges the edge where corners have to balance the responsibility to prevent deep passing plays with the almost contradictory responsibility for not allowing someone like Austin to make an easy catch and run.

In adherence with Mike Leach's guiding wisdom of "throwing it short to people who can score," up to November 17th Holgorsen had utilized Austin mostly with screen passes, shallow crossing routes, sweeps, and other short passes that could easily be completed and caught. From there, Austin would put his real skill to work.

At 5'8", 173 pounds, Austin is a smaller man. Yet that size often has overlooked advantages on the gridiron. As a defensive coordinator can tell you, it's rare to find a corner who's 6' or taller and still possesses the change of direction and recovery speed necessary to mirror routes by receivers. While shorter legs have to work faster to cover grass, they can often allow a player to change direction and speed much more fluidly. This is where Austin excels.

Out in space, when it's a matter of a defender trying to corner him and bring him down, he's absolutely deadly. His 5.7 highlight yards per carry reveal a player who routinely gained additional yards beyond what his OL set up. For comparison's sake, Alabama's Eddie Lacy and TJ Yeldon averaged 2.6 and 2.3 highlight yards per carry.

NFL-laden secondaries both at Oklahoma and at LSU in 2011 frequently looked like matadors trying to corral Austin. The elite LSU secondary yielded 187 receiving yards to his quick churning legs.

Tavon Austin is really a running back. You get him the ball in a prepared setting and let him go to work. Getting caught up in whether he obtains possession through a handoff, toss, or forward pass misses the greater point, which is what comes after he has the ball.

In the week leading up to November 17th, Dana Holgorsen realized that Tavon Austin was a running back, and repeatedly got him the ball in this set up:

The genius of this formation is in the multiple ways it stresses Oklahoma. First you have the bunched, trip receivers set at the bottom of the screen. That presents obvious flanking and leverage problems for the defense to account for. A failure to line up enough defenders there will inevitably result in easy pitch and catch screen passes that will go for five to 15 yards a pop.

But Holgorsen left his two best players out of the bunch set. Stedman Bailey is split wide to the other side of the field and Tavon Austin is in the backfield at running back. Addressing the structural problems of the formation will probably necessitate leaving a few defenders isolated against Austin and Bailey.

Here, Stoops responds to this formation with a package often known as "the dollar" package. If a nickel defense brings in five DB's and a dime defense brings in six, the dollar features SEVEN defensive backs and, in this case, no linebackers.

In the linebacker spot is Julian Wilson, tasked with matching up Austin and ensuring Oklahoma can play man coverage without Austin ripping them to shreds. The problem is this, this isn't coverage anymore. You can't use a DB to make sure that Austin doesn't get the ball on Inside or Outside Zone, you have to beat OL blocks and take away the running lanes and space that make Austin dangerous.

OU's dollar package was completely unable to do this, and their dime defense wasn't any better. Austin showed remarkable ability to set up the second level of the defense and encourage them into one crease before darting through another and then humiliating the hapless DBs who had to run him down.

He accumulated 344 rushing yards on 21 carries (an average of 16.4 yards per carry) with another 82 receiving yards on four catches. That's 426 offensive yards on 25 touches and 17 yards per touch. Had Oklahoma played nickel defense and relied on their linebackers to close running lanes they may have had more success, although then they would have had to cover Austin or other receivers with less skilled defenders. At any rate, what they did attempt was completely useless in preventing Austin from inflicting nearly crippling damage. Were it not for West Virginia's own helplessness in stopping Landry Jones, this could have been a Heisman moment for Austin.

The NFL is slowly catching on to how to use players who excel in space that NFL offenses haven't always been geared towards creating. Today, Percy Harvin, Wes Welker, Darren Sproles, and Danny Woodhead routinely demonstrate the great value that can exist in smaller players like Austin.

The remaining question is one of durability. At 173 pounds, it probably isn't a great idea to use Austin as a feature back in the run game and risk seeing him injured. But, after moving him to running back, West Virginia managed to get Austin the ball 19 times per game without sustaining an injury. In those four games he touched the ball 76 times for 861 yards for 11.3 yards per touch.

Throughout his college career he avoided injury, probably in part because he is too slippery for defenders to make good contact. It's reasonable to believe that an NFL team could get him the ball five to 15 times per game through easy receptions, screens, runs, and perhaps the occasional deep lob. While that may seem like minimal use for a running back, if you can get 100 or so yards from a player in only 10 possessions, that's tremendous. Then there's his obvious value as a kick returner.

The key for NFL teams is that they don't diss his skillset by attempting to mold him into another Steve Smith and use him like a classic receiver. He's a running back in the truest sense, make it easy for him to get the ball and then enjoy the show.

Texas Longhorns Spring Football 2013: What do we need from the linebackers?

2013-03-20T16:44:59Z

You could say that defenses tend to follow two main strategies: playing outside in, or inside out. Muschamp and Saban's defenses play outside in with people like Kindle restricting the outside running lanes and forcing the action inside where big people are waiting to beat you up and bring you down.

Dick LeBeau's 3-4 may have similar personnel but they are playing inside out. Players look to fill the inside gaps and force the runner outside where the pursuit and secondary can clean up. "Spill it and kill it" is often the motto, particularly for 4-2-5 teams.

There's nothing wrong with either approach, you can find immensely successful defenses execute each strategy. Diaz defenses play inside out.

However, the Fire Zone marries the two approaches depending on the call. If it's an inside blitz, the ball may be forced outside, but on an outside blitz the ball is forced back inside. Within all the stunts and blitzes of the Diaz defense it's incumbent on 2nd level "hot zone" defenders to read blocks and plays and make the right fills necessary to execute either.

There may be a great simplicity to how Diaz teaches the Hot Zones but they are still a difficult task that requires the defender to anticipate where the ball will go and arrive there with suddenness. If the Hot Zone duties are performed well, you can get an INT, PBU, coverage sack or tackle for little or no gain. If they are done adequately you may get a short gain on a pass or run. If they are done poorly, the RB or receiver may explode through a major crease in the defense and require the DB's to arrive and make an open field tackle against an offensive player with momentum.

I reviewed some tapes of games at the end of the year (TCU and OSU) to get a feel for how our linebackers had come along in understanding their assignments within the defense and whether their physical gifts were a match for what they need to be able to do.

I noted during these reviews the following fact that I'd like to add as an addendum to my earlier piece on the 2013 secondary. Why it is that Mykelle Thompson seems to have the advantage over Josh Turner on the depth chart.

It's because his athleticism and leverage enables him to always get in the way. He made several saving tackles in both games (TCU and OSU) by being able to keep ballcarriers in space in front of him and make the tackle. His tackles are almost always of the "get in the way, absorb the blow, bring the ballcarrier down over your own body" variety and he's certainly not intimidating, but he is an eraser by virtue of his ability to cover wide stretches of field.

But back to the linebackers, I'm going present answers to the following questions: What are Big 12 linebackers required to do? What does Diaz ask linebackers to do? What are the strengths, weaknesses, and schematic matches of our current personnel?

1). The demands of the Big 12

I examined the demands of playing linebacker in a 4-2 alignment last summer and explained playing the run inside out and Diaz's approach of using confusion and speed to exploit the physical limitations of 300 pound college students.

However, Diaz's defense had serious problems this last year due to nature of his blitz calls, the nature of zone blocking, and the diagnostic skills necessary for non-blitzing players.

I was surprised and delighted to find our linebackers making appropriate fills against the run by the end of the year while also disturbed and disgusted by Diaz play calls that voided their gains. The Diaz formula for run defense is based on the principal that a defense can survive a 5-15 yard gain more easily than the offense can survive a negative play. That's a great foundational truth for a defensive philosophy.

But in practice, if you repeatedly call a blitz in which the defensive end has to fill an A gap against Inside Zone, you are going to rely on DB tackling to ensure only 5-15 yard gains while rarely seeing a negative play.

I watched the Texas defense use this blitz call at least four or five times in about five quarters of football and be gashed by inside zone over and over again. The nature of zone blocking is to create creases and allow the running back to find them by making quick reads and cuts. You cannot ask a defensive end to move laterally into the "Hot 3" zone and fill an interior gap against an RB who's already flying through it with momentum. Especially on a 1st and 10.

The point is this: Big 12 run games require linebackers (or 2nd level defenders) who can quickly reach and fill interior gaps and defend them against interior OL and hard charging runners. It also requires linebackers who can make plays in space against screen passes, sweeps, and outside zone, all of which require sideline to sideline speed.

Then there's filling passing windows against the intermediate passing game and making tackles all over the field to save touchdowns from successful plays. A Big 12 linebacker needs to be explosive in a small area, decisive in his play, and able to roam large stretches of field. It's a demanding job. The ideal LB would run 4.6 or better, be in the 6'2" to 6'4" range, and 220-240 pounds.

2). The demands of the Diaz defense

Technically, the stunts and blitzes in Diaz's defense are supposed to help the linebacker by confusing the offense, requiring them to make quick reads in the face of pressure, and setting up opportunities to get into the backfield. Ideally, a Diaz linebacker has the speed and suddenness I've described above, but also the understanding of what an offense is doing and how to be aggressive in both attacking and covering up vulnerable spots.

Recognition and decisive response is probably more important even than speed in the Big 12 and linebackers who can't understand how to fill gaps behind stunting and twisting DL will be pancaked and useless. They also won't be able to fill passing windows and take away underneath passes, forcing them to chase faster players all day.

Generally the NFL combine reveals players like Manti Te'o who are not particularly fast, but play faster than kids with much quicker 40 times because they diagnose and respond so quickly. Against some of the finesse offenses in this league the ability to quickly be where you need to be will carry the equivalent of 20 pounds and a notch off your 40 time when dealing with OL blocks.

3). How do the linebackers on campus fit?

Again, I was encouraged by how the linebackers seemed to be catching on to the system by the end of the year. Oregon St and TCU both exposed bad run defense but the problems were usually a result of mistakes by backup DE's and insane Diaz playcalls. Mistakes by linebackers were a much smaller piece of the pie.

Steve Edmond

When Edmond understands how to fill against a particular run play, he's extremely effective. His long arms and powerful base enable him to absorb and shed blockers with apparent ease. They also allow him to drag down ballcarriers.

In pass coverage, when he makes the right read he can fulfill his obligations. He can chase and cover RB's out of the backfield or he can fill interior passing lanes with his long arms. We've already seen that his soft hands make interceptions a possibility as well.

If he's confused and drawn out of position, or the play goes somewhere else, he's simply not a factor. He can't change direction and accelerate in the open field.

Perhaps more weight loss will enable him to be more effective but the facts are these; Edmond was both recruited and born to be a 3-4 inside backer in a defense that constricts the offense into the middle of the field and asks it to operate in tight spaces. In the Diaz defense he can "spill it" but he's not much at "killing it" when the ball goes outside. He has value in base defense as an interior gap defender, as a blitzer, and as a Hot 3 defender when the blitz forces the ball inside.

I'm not sure that he can become a complete backer in this defense, in this league.

Dalton Santos

At whatever weight he played at in the Alamo Bowl, Santos is a better match as a Diaz Mike backer. He still needs serious seasoning and experience in understanding how to build the wall but physically he has the ability to handle the physicality inside and the speed to play sideline to sideline in pursuit.

In that game he made a few mental errors but he tended to make them at full speed, at least. When Edmond didn't know what was going on last year he tended to hesitate and get blocked.

Kendall Thompson

Even at the end of the year Thompson was a player more prone to hesitation and mistakes. He has the suddenness to be a good blitzer and interior defender but I'd say that his best fit in the defense is at Will, where there are two better candidates.

Peter Jinkens

Jinkens is exactly what you want in a Big 12 linebacker. If he's in a running crease inside, he's going to be extremely difficult to get around due to his quick hips. In coverage, he can run with someone in man2man or pick up and carry receivers in his zone.

With Jordan Hicks coming back and two solid candidates at Mike linebacker I'm not sure where he fits in 2013 but he needs to be on the field regularly. He's physical enough to play inside but still athletic and fast enough to do everything else. I'm hoping they are working him out at SAM to be what we hoped Cobbs would be in 2012.

Demarco Cobbs

Cobbs is possibly an even better athletic fit for this league than Jinkens, because he's also tall. He's physical, can handle playing inside, can run with receivers, can change directions, etc.

Unfortunately he plays with terrible leverage and has no idea what he's doing half the time. He's evidently injured so I don't know how he will fit into the equation in 2013. If nothing else, athletically this is the kind of guy Diaz should keep looking for.

Jordan Hicks

A complete player. Has the physical and mental qualities necessary to be a star linebacker here. I would start him at Will and move him inside to Mike in the Dime packages.

Tevin Jackson

Jackson is sort of the odd man out when Hicks returns. They played him at SAM a lot towards the end of the year with Jinkens staying inside at Will. Jinkens is the faster player and more natural fit at SAM but Jackson was not as good inside because he's not as quick to diagnose and fill on inside running plays.

Playing inside linebacker at Will or Mike requires a player that reads the run flow and gets downhill to where they need to be in an awful hurry. Jackson and Thompson have the suddenness but they don't always react quickly enough to make use of it.

That said, Jackson was very valuable in Dime packages last year. He plays in space well and is a solid blitzer. If nothing else, he'll provide great depth so that LB play doesn't go over a cliff again if someone's hurt.

All in all, there's a chance that our great suffering amidst the growing pains of 2012 will pay off in 2013 with a linebacker corp that can actually thrive and do damage. The main hangup is this: if the linebackers understand how to diagnose running plays quickly and understand how to play with leverage as Hot zone defenders in the blitz, they can unlock the physical attributes that made them four and five star recruits that everyone wanted.

Most all of these guys have tremendous athleticism or speed that will translate into negative plays, jarring hits, and really aggressive and stunning play once they know where to aim. After reviewing tape I actually have hope this might occur.

I'm sure Diaz is praying every night that it does.

Texas Longhorns Spring Football 2013: What do we need from the secondary?

2013-03-14T16:15:45Z

As Drew would be happy to recount for you, the golden standard of Mack Brown-Texas Football, the 2005 Championship team, was absolutely loaded in the secondary. When the team wanted to play nickel personnel the defensive backs on the field were:

C/N: Aaron Ross, 6-0, 195: Current starter for the Jacksonville Jaguars

C: Cedric Griffin, 6-1, 205: Longtime starter for the Minnesota Vikings

C: Tarell Brown, 6-0, 200: Starter for the San Francisco Giants

S/N: Michael Huff, 6-0, 205: Longtime starter for the Oakland Raiders

S: Michael Griffin, 6-0, 202: Former Pro-Bowler for the Tennessee Titans

Everyone one of them was big, fast, and physical, and they were all upperclassmen. They could play man coverage up tight, they could play soft coverage and reliably make physical tackles, they could bring extra physicality in the box, and they were rangy in deep coverage.

While that defense had future NFL players on the DL as well, most of what that crew accomplished came from those DBs. Similarly, Muschamp's defense in 2009 was anchored by his nickel lineup that went:

C: Curtis Brown, 6-0, 185: backup for the Pittsburgh Steelers

N/C: Aaron Williams, 6-0, 204: backup for the Buffalo Bills

S/N: Earl Thomas, 5-10, 205: Starter for the Seattle Seahawks and arguably league's best safety

S: Blake Gideon, 6-1, 205: Practice squad member for the Denver Broncos

C: Chykie Brown, 5'11, 190: Starter for the Baltimore Ravens

This crew was not as good as the 2005 bunch, although Earl Thomas might have been the best player in either secondary. The postal service (Brown and Brown) were not as big and physical as their 2005 counterparts and really only Aaron Williams and Earl Thomas provided the same kind of swiss army knife versatility that was true for almost everyone on the 05 group.

Nevertheless, as a unit they were excellent as each player was pretty outstanding in the roles that the scheme required of them.

Many of us had some hope that the 2012 defensive secondary would be another legendary gathering of Akina-fashioned dominators. As a general rule, it seems that Longhorn fans can expect the defense to depend somewhat on the performance of the secondary as Mack teams have been very inconsistent in developing the linebacker corp that serves as the playmakers in most schemes, not least the Diaz system.

However, the 2012 crew disappointed. Opposing teams managed 7.6 yards per pass attempt, after only allowing only 6 per attempt in 2011. Reviewing the tape, you find major inconsistencies both in the team's play and in their approach.

Manny Diaz and Akina deployed a very diverse attack in 2012 that ranged from playing 2-deep based MOFO (middle of field open) coverages against the pass-heavy spread teams on the schedule (Baylor, WV, OSU) with more MOFC (middle of field closed) coverages against teams with running games.

There was disguise in every package and a myriad of different techniques and positions for the different players to play. Clearly, the coaches thought that the 2012 secondary might be a legendary, water-carrying unit as well. They were not.

Adrian Phillips was asked to play 2-deep safety, deep centerfielder, linebacker, and nickel after missing much of the offseason and struggled mightily. His positioning was inconsistent, he frequently lost leverage on ballcarriers, and his tackling was horrendous.

Carrington Byndom had a really inconsistent start to the year as well and didn't always display the physical play that helped him stand out in 2011. Diggs was generally fantastic but torched by Terrance Williams. We've talked at length about what Vaccaro achieved.

Josh Turner and Mykelle Thompson got a lot of meaningful snaps and experience and flashed some of what they offer. Turner is a physical player who seems to excel mostly as a support player in zone. Thompson has the athletic ability to do all the things Akina and Diaz are asking of our safeties but he hasn't done anything on the field yet to put the fear of God into a receiver or runner.

So what are the prospects for 2013? Let's cover how these guys will be asked to cover for everyone else:

Nickel: What Texas does here will line up much of what the rest of the secondary is doing. The nickel doesn't need to be as fast as a corner in terms of recovery speed, but rather a guy that is quick in a small area, has the physicality to guide receivers to the linebackers or safeties located conveniently nearby, length and anticipation to wall off passing routes, and the physicality to play in the box as a run-stopper and blitzer.

Adrian Phillips has already played here a lot and is a natural fit although Diggs is apparently getting a lot of action here as well. Very likely, without a six foot swiss army knife here, they may go back to "big nickel" "little nickel" and play both of them here depending on what they want. Diggs is fantastic covering and tackling in an area like this and would be great for the MOFC defenses but Phllips is the better option when the position is taking on a more linebacker-like function in the MOFO defenses.

Corner: Against Baylor, Diaz hoped to play soft/off coverage and simply tackle well in order to minimize Baylor drives and get off the field. With West Virginia or Oregon State these guys would often play press coverage and mirror their opponent down the field. No one in their right mind would depend on their DB's reliably tackling Tavon Austin after the catch.

In any event, the nature of the spread offense generally asks that Corners handle the sideline and don't allow guys to run past them. Texas is probably as well off here as any other team in the conference, pending how they utilize Diggs. Quandre excels more in off coverage where he can explode to the ball when it's released from the QB's hand. Byndom is better at simply locking down guys in press coverage, although he has the ability to make tackles in off coverage as well.

If the coaches use Diggs extensively as the Nickel that opens the door for Duke Thomas, presumably, to handle duties on the outside. If I'm right about Diggs being more of a man-coverage nickel, this will require Thomas to be trusted not to get beat deep down the sideline. I believe he has the catch-up speed and long arms to be trusted here but the proof's in the pudding, as they say.

Safety: It was stunning how much Akina and Diaz asked of the safeties in 2012, although I'm quite sure a good deal of it was unintentional. Against Baylor, they started the game as deep as 15 yards off the ball, with Akina having learned the lesson in 2011 of trying to maintain deep leverage on Baylor's inside receivers while playing run-force.

This proved very tricky when teams like WV and Baylor could command the deep alignment of the safeties but then run through the middle of the defense regardless of how tight Vaccaro packed in or how many stunts Diaz called. Similarly, the MOFC defenses didn't enable the linebackers well enough to save the safeties from having to make tackles in run support from centerfield or man-coverage, which is more difficult than in 2-read defenses.

Josh Turner is the best enforcer and tackler of the returning bunch although Phillips has excelled there in the past. Thompson is a very difficult player to get past, either in coverage or as a runner, but he doesn't yet deliver big blows in run support. He racked up a large number of tackles against Oregon State simply by doing a good job as "last man" and jumping on piles.

It's anyone's guess if and when Thompson might make the leap that players like Cedric Griffin and Michael Huff made before him into aggressive and confident tacklers.

In the meantime, the talent back there is miscast for all of the schematic diversity that Akina and Diaz want to employ. In MOFC defenses, it's optimal if both safeties can either defend the seam from the inside receiver, or play centerfield. Phillips should be able to handle either of those tasks and Thompson has the ability to do so as well. In these defenses, the linebackers are protected from rangy coverage roles and can stay in the box.

In the MOFO defenses you want safeties who can stay on top of receivers and make lots of open field tackles. Again, Phillips has shown he can do this and Turner looks like a potential stud in this role.

Finally there are the Fire Zones which are basically a 3rd style of base defense for the 'horns. In these, safeties may blitz, play centerfield, or play in the "hot zones" which requires anticipation, leverage, quicks, and open field tackling.

Barring Thompson or Turner making a leap and without knowing if Phillips can recover the versatility and form that made him so promising in 2011, it's hard to project this secondary as being dominant enough to carry the defense and swarm everything the offense attempts from their eryries in the backfield.

Truly in this defense, it's incumbent on the linebackers to anchor the defense as playmakers in creating pressure and stopping the run. We'll examine them next.

Poll

Which DB will be the most important for Texas in 2013?

Adrian Phillips

92 votes

Carrington Byndom

40 votes

Quandre Diggs

146 votes

Josh Turner

15 votes

Mykelle Thompson

21 votes

Other

5 votes

319 votes | Poll has closed